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The literature on "ethnic conflict" tends to focus solely on external sources of such 
conflict. But this unquestioning focus on ethnic conflict as due to factors in the relationship 
between "ethnic groups” or their elites may at times be misleading. Drawing on a critique of 
conflict theory as developed in the field of international relations, I point out the conceptual 
and methodological problems associated with the analysis of inter-group conflict, and point 
to the importance of within-group conflict, especially conflict between elites, as sources of 
external conflict. I apply this critique to the concept of ethnic conflict and point out the 
consequences of such questioning for understanding the causes of violent conflict along ethnic 
lines.
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Ethnic solidarity and its impact on political behavior has in recent years become a 
central focus of the social sciences, due in large part to the spate of violent conflicts described 
as "ethnic" in various parts of the world. Yet while the concept of ethnicity itself has un­
dergone indepth analysis and deconstruction, the phenomenon of "ethnic conflict," though 
much studied, has not been as critically examined. The large literature on the phenomenon 
mostly takes as a given that violence along ethnic cleavages is caused by relations between 
two ethnic groups, either due to the nature of ethnicity itself or because of an objective or 
perceived conflict of interest between the two ethnic groups (or their elites). Conflict along 
ethnic lines is thus portrayed as the result of attempts by groups of people defined in terms 
of ethnicity to achieve specific goals vis-ä-vis other similarly defined groups of people. The 
very expression "ethnic conflict" reflects this assumption.
In this paper I attempt to show that such unquestioning focus on conflict as externally 
motivated may at times be misleading. Drawing on a critique of conflict theory as developed 
in the field of international relations, I point out the conceptual and methodological pro­
blems associated with the analysis of inter-group conflict, and demonstrate the importance 
of within-group sources of external violence. I apply this critique to the concept of ethnic 
conflict and point out the consequences of such questioning for understanding the causes 
of violent conflict along ethnic lines. This preliminary attempt to conceptualize ethnic con­
flict in turn will, I hope, contribute to our understanding of how society-level processes such 
as ethnic identity affect the international system, and in particular how they are related to 
violent conflict at the international level.
Ethnic Conflict as an Intergroup Phenomenon
That conflict along ethnic lines is to some degree related to the existence of ethnic 
identities is not disputed; questioning the concept of ethnic conflict does not necessarily 
require rejecting as irrelevant the concept of ethnicity itself. Ethnic identity may in fact be 
quite important and indeed central to many people, whether it is constructed or "primordial".
81
Gagnon, V. P.: Ethnic Conflict. Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXVI. (1995), No 1-2: 81-9()
But despite the arguments of some of the ethnic conflict literature, the existence of ethnic 
identity does not in and of itself in any logical way explain the outbreak of violent conflict 
along ethnic lines. In fact, this structural explanation (that is, that the very existence of 
ethnic groups is a structural condition that leads inevitably to conflict along those lines, 
which in turn escalates to violence) does not account for the absence of conflict along ethnic 
lines in areas which are ethnically heterogeneous, nor does it explain the timing of conflict, 
that is, what determines why and when a conflict breaks out along ethnic cleavages and when 
it becomes violent. It also assumes its conclusion, that is, it assumes that the very existence 
of ethnic groups causes conflict (Posen, 1993; at a macro-level, Huntington, 1993).
A more common approach in the literature on ethnic conflict focuses on the role of 
elites of an ethnic group. Elites ("political entrepreneuers") acting in the name of the ethnic 
group pursue policies meant to improve the security and well-being of the group vis-a-vis 
other groups, or to improve their own standing vis-a-vis elites of other ethnic groups. In 
this approach, ethnic conflict is either a part of or a consequence of a wider strategy meant 
to advance the interest of the ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985; Esman, 1995).
A third approach stresses the role of individuals, where ethnic mobilization is portrayed 
as collective action in which individuals rationally decide to act together in the form of an 
ethnic group in order to improve their well-being and security. Conflict is just one type of 
such rational, utility-maximizing collective action (Hechter, 1986).
These three approaches all have in common a focus on ethnic groups as units of ana­
lysis, as collectives (or groups of individuals) seeking to realize their interest and ensure 
their security vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Violent conflict is thus the expression of the 
interest of the group, either because it is a response to group grievances, or because conflict 
is a strategy by which to take advantage of opportunities for the group to benefit. The cause 
of all action is to be found in the relations between ethnic groups, and the determining 
explanatory factors for conflict are found in the environment external to the group. In effect, 
the preferences, the costs and the benefits are all to be found in the external environment.
Yet even if political mobilization and collective action are most effective along ethnic 
lines, does violent conflict along these lines always represent merely a further step toward 
realizing the interest of the ethnic group? This is an especially germane question because 
those violent outbreaks that are classified as "ethnic conflicts" for the most part take place 
in ethnically heterogeneous environments. In such situations, any violent conflict of necessity 
has very negative effects not only in a material sense, due to the destruction of property, 
infrastructure, etc., but also due to psychological damage and the extremely negative conse­
quences of violence in terms of interpersonal relations and the social environment.
To answer this question and better understand this phenomenon, I suggest taking a 
critical look at the concept of intergroup conflict. To this end, I suggest an approach that 
is based on a conceptual and methodological critique of conflict theory and its implicit 
assumption that conflict between two groups is the result of interactions between the groups. 
Rather, this approach points out that conflict may in fact be the outcome of processes 
internal to one or both of the sides. In other words, external conflict may serve an internal 
purpose that may not even be related to the external conflict: while the costs of a conflictual 
policy may be incurred in the external environment, the benefits and the preferences being 
realized may in fact be located in the internal sphere.
Conflict Theory and International Relations
Much work on the concept of violent conflict has been undertaken in the field of 
international relations (IR), and a growing number of interstate conflicts are described and 
justified in terms of ethnic solidarity. In addition, Donald Horowitz (1985) notes the simi­
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larity between the way ethnic conflict literature looks at relations between ethnic groups and 
the way international relations theories talk about interstate relations. These factors indicate 
that a critique of international relations theories of conflict is a good place to start to re- 
conceptualize ethnic conflict.
The basic, most prevalent approach in international relations, and the one to which 
Horowitz refers when noting the similarities between relations between ethnic groups and 
interstate relations, is called "Realism," and takes the state as the basic unit of analysis. The 
state, or elites who act in the interest of the state, are rational actors who interact with other 
states (or other leaders) in the international arena, motivated by the goal of ensuring state 
survival and security. This approach sees interstate relations as determined by this interac­
tion in the nonhierarchical environment of the international arena. Based on these assum­
ptions, Realism concludes that violent conflict between states is the natural outcome of 
competition between states for resources, territory, and security (Morgenthau, 1964; Waltz, 
1979; Keohane, 1986). Those versions of realism that take individual decision makers rather 
than states as the focus of behavior also assume that decision makers base their actions on 
the interest of the state vis-ä-vis the outside world, and that conflict is the result of motiva­
tions, goals, preferences and other factors outside the borders of the state.1
But by focusing exclusively on the outside, on the international arena, IR ignores the 
most basic tenet of theories of political realism: the centrality of power. This is the starting 
point of my critique of IR approaches to interstate conflict, and of other theories of inter­
group conflict as well. This critique is, like Realism, based on the assumption that political 
actors are rational (in the sense that their behavior is intentional and goal-oriented, taking 
into account preferences, costs and benefits) and that their priority goal is to achieve or 
maintain power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends. But unlike Realists 
this approach recognizes that the centrality of power as a goal means that political actors 
will quite often focus not on the outside world, but rather on survival in the domestic political 
arena, including preserving the domestic structures of power on which a leader’s position 
and the support of his/her main constituencies are based.2 Politics in the domestic sphere is 
about competition between elites seeking to gain and/or maintain power in the face of chal­
lenges from other elites; the competition takes the form of attempts to gain the support of 
specific necessary parts of the politically relevant population and of those elites who control 
"power resources" (economic, military, informational). Much of political behavior will thus 
have as its goal this internal competition for support. By recognizing the centrality of do­
mestic power to national political leaders, this approach, unlike IR Realism and most other 
IR theories, thus points out that power factors in the domestic arena must be explicitly 
considered in any analysis of behavior toward the outside world. It thus also points out that 
despite the claims of IR Realists to the contrary, non-material power resources such as 
legitimacy and authority, and ideas of culture such as ethnicity and religion do have an
1 Such an assumption is seen not only in Realist approaches that look to decision makers, but also in most of 
the IR critiques of Realism. For example one set of critiques of Realism focuses on cognitive processes, belief systems 
and perceptions of decision makers to explain their foreign policy decisions (Jervis, 1976; Holsti, 1971). But they focus 
only on beliefs and perceptions about the international arena, ignoring the fact that any behavior also takes into account 
the immediate (domestic) environment in which a political actor exists. They also face the methodological obstacle of 
identifying beliefs that cause behavior without inferring them directly from that behavior (explaining the dependent 
variable with reference to the dependent variable). In fact, much of the evidence they use to infer beliefs is itself 
political behavior, which, although in the form of spoken statements, nevertheless cannot be understood as merely 
"expressive behavior."
This is not to say that what happens in the international environment is irrelevant to foreign policy behavior. 
Rather, external events matter to the extent that they affect a decision maker’s ability to maintain power or the domestic 
structure of power. At times, international factors may indeed be the decisive factors. But this is clearly not always 
the case.
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impact on the international arena, because they are key instruments of power in the domestic 
arena.
Indeed, in the domestic arena in order to gain the support of the necessary politically 
relevant population (or to neutralize their opposition), political leaders over the long term 
usually cannot rely only on the threat of punishment or on promises of immediate material 
rewards. Although such factors are perhaps always implicitly present, of key importance are 
nonmaterial power resources such as legitimacy and authority, which provide leaders with 
the ability to influence people without reference to immediate sanctions, positive or negative. 
Such nonmaterial bases of power in turn rely on ideas of culture such as religion and ethni­
city, that is, the communities and values of the politically relevant population of a state. 
Leaders must respond to the population’s preferences not only in terms of economic well­
being but also in terms of preferences related to such noneconomic values. Indeed, one of 
the most effective influence strategies is to appeal to politically relevant actors as members 
of a group defined in ideational (cultural, ethnic or religious) terms. In effect political 
appeals are expressed in the "language" of group interest defined culturally. Ideas like ethni­
city thus play an important role as an instrument of influence in the domestic political arena.
Interstate Conflict: Image and Reality
In building images of legitimacy and in gaining support that ensures the survival of 
existing structures of power, an important role is played by the very concept of the "state", 
and the interests ascribed to the state. Of course, objectively the institutions and the territory 
of the state exist. But perhaps more important is the image of the state as a unit, as a 
political entity which has specific interests. The community of citizens of a state, like the 
"nation", is indeed a construction, an imagined community, but one which has acquired an 
apparent reality such that to be without state citizenship is to be a nonperson. The con­
struction of the image of the state and its identity is, as Anderson (1992) points out, linked 
to an "ideology" in the wider sense of the word; the justification for the state’s existence and 
the legitimacy of its leadership is based not only on ensuring physical and economic security, 
but also on ensuring other, noneconomic interests.3 Most commonly this state identity is 
linked in some way to a cultural identity of the politically relevant population.
Realists build their arguments on the assumption that the state is a natural entity, and 
that states are basically all similar units, all having the same goal of survival. (Waltz (1979) 
uses the analogy of enterprises, all of which have the similar goal of making a profit and 
expanding market share.) But in fact, the functions and goals of states are highly contested. 
Beyond the goal of survival, states have no single objective criterion to ascertain priority 
goals. Indeed, different groups within the state usually have very different visions of what 
the state’s main goal should be, expressed in terms of conflicting basic values for the domestic 
political system. The fact that political conflict over the proper goal of the state is a defining 
characteristic of any state means that different domestic actors will also view the state’s 
relations with the outside in very different ways.
Politics in the domestic arena is all about this contestation of the officially defined role 
and interest of the state. For those with power, this contention and challenging of the role 
of the state, especially its relationship to the domestic structure of power and those who 
control power resources, can at times present a tremendous threat. In this context the 
constructed image of the state as a real community of people who share common interests 
is a very powerful tool; this image can be used to create an apparent confluence of interest
3 Here I use political philosopher Walter Carlsnaes’ definition of ideology as "a political doctrine which purports 
to motivate an actor P to do y (or not to do z) for the collective intererst of Q." (1986:150).
84
Gagnon, V. P.: Ethnic Conflict. Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXVI (1995). No 1-2: 81-9()
between the preservation of the existing structure of power and the interests of the wider 
population defined in terms of state security and survival (that is, the survival and security 
of the community of state citizens); or in terms of a legitimating idea such as ethnicity (that 
is, linking the survival of the ethnic community to the survival of the state). Creating an 
image of an "objective" interest of the state vis-ä-vis the outside is a powerful way to influence 
this domestic political competition.
Power and Discourse
Power theorists have pointed to what they call the "second face of power" as a key 
element of power relations: the ability to control the political agenda, to determine what 
options are to be considered in the political arena (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). The ability 
to set the agenda, to determine the limits of legitimate political discourse and political action, 
in effect controls the outcome, limiting it to very specific possibilities in a way that may 
overcome the preferences of the population. Rather than the classic concept of influence 
or power, where an actor induces the target to do something or not to do something, this 
strategy of agenda-setting indirectly creates a situation in which the outcome is already pre­
determined despite the preferences of the target; the target may never have a chance to 
realize first or even second preferences, but may have to settle for the only available outcome.
This concept of agenda-setting points to the importance of political discourse in power 
relations. Indeed, shaping the limits and focus of political discourse in effect creates the 
limits and focus of political possibilities; the struggle over political discourse is thus often a 
key moment in political competition or struggle for power. Political actors may therefore 
undertake actions with the express intention of affecting political discourse rather than me­
rely as an end in themselves. Especially in cases where the preferences of the majority of 
politically relevant actors threaten the very structure of domestic power, it is vitally important 
for the threatened elites to shift the focus of political debate, to affect the terms of political 
discourse in such a way as to remove these preferences even from legitimate consideration. 
One way to do this is to identify the existing structure of power with the interest of the 
state, either in terms of the community of state citizens (defined perhaps in ethnic terms), 
or in terms of the state’s relations with the outside world (or in terms of relations with other 
ethnically-defined states), and to portray the state’s existence (and thus the well-being of 
the state community however defined) as threatened.
Thus a key part of such a strategy is to create the perception of a real, immediate 
threat. In the case where there is no external threat, a credible image of a threat must be 
created, even if this involves provoking conflict with the outside world. Such an action will 
have as its primary goal influencing domestic political discourse in an attempt to affect 
domestic political realities, rather than influencing relations with the outside. Indeed, if the 
potential costs to ruling elites of changing structures of domestic power are very high, those 
elites most threatened will be willing to undertake policies that impose very high costs on 
society as a whole and even on their own interests in the short term if it will ensure their 
survival in power. Of key importance here is the fact that information about the outside 
world is available only indirectly to the vast majority of the population; such indirect sources 
of information (media) are in the hands of elites, who thus have the ability to construct a 
specific image of outside reality in a way that corresponds to their own interests.4
Violent conflict vis-ä-vis the outside may thus be undertaken in order to achieve specific 
goals within the domestic arena. Such conflict, by creating an image of external threat to 
the state and its inhabitants, constructs a discourse in which this external threat outweighs
4 For a fuller elaboration of these points, see Gagnon (1994/95).
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all other interests and reinforces the image of the state as a reality, that is, the image of a 
true community of interest of all citizens of the state. The result is not necessarily to change 
the population’s actual beliefs, perceptions or preferences about their own immediate lives, 
but rather to create a political discourse focused on the external threat, to shift discourse 
away from issues threatening to parts of the elite, for example threats to the structure of 
power. The effect is to create a political environment in which there is little choice; rather 
than actually changing preferences, this strategy changes the possibility of realizing particular 
preferences, creating a situation in which people have very limited options. This strategy 
thus effectively demobilizes those parts of the population whose main political preference 
is to shift the structure of power, because the issues around which they were mobilizing have 
become politically irrelevant. It also works to reinforce the image of a world of similarly 
monolithic state actors, further reifying the image of the state as a community of interest 
vis-ä-vis other states. It thus creates an image where the very existence of different states 
means that interests are automatically different along state cleavages, while interests with 
the state are identical.5 The implication, of course, is that anyone within the state who 
disagrees with this official view of that interest is by definition an enemy of the state and 
of its citizens, as beyond the community of state citizens.
This explains how violent conflict, although perhaps not rational from the point of view 
of state security or the well-being of the population, nevertheless may be a rational response 
by political actors to threats to their security and power interests from within the state.
Methodologically, the implication of this approach is that the meaning of violent con- 
flictual behavior cannot be sought only in the environment external to the state (or the 
group). Rather, hypotheses must also be allowed that look to internal sources of external 
behavior, regardless of the fact that the justifications and descriptions of protagonists of 
conflict are always framed in terms of the world external to the state (or to the group). In 
the case of interstate relations, only by getting beyond this rhetoric of state interest and 
state security can we begin to understand not only the role of ideas of culture in the inter­
national system, but also the sources of violent conflicts which so often prove extremely 
costly to states and their populations.
Conflict Theory and Ethnic Conflict
Applying this critique to violent conflicts along ethnic lines, what becomes immediately 
clear is that any analysis of this kind of conflict must be willing to look beyond the supposed 
interest of groups of people (or elites) defined by ethnicity to understand the reasons for 
violent conflict. First, who is in conflict? The concept of the "ethnic group" as a party to 
conflict, as a unit with identifiable interests, is even more debatable than the concept of the 
state. This is not to say that people do not identify themselves ethnically or that ethnicity 
is some kind of false consciousness. Rather, just as state citizenship is a reality that exists 
yet does not in itself determine the goals, values or preferred policies of those who are 
citizens of the state, so too the mere existence of an ethnic identity does not a priori deter­
mine any commonality of interest with others with a similar identity (even "affective" inte­
rest), other than in cases of extreme threat to existence based solely on that identity.
5 Of particular interest here is the degree to which the academic field of international relations reflected these 
images and in fact served to legitimate them. It is perhaps no coincidence that the hegemonic theoretical approach in 
the field of IR coincides exactly with this ideological construct, nor that this "Realist" construct arose in American 
academic circles in the early years of the Cold War, when the enemy image of Soviet Russia played an enormously 
important domestic political role in the face of socio-economic trends in American society that foresaged the possibility 
of tremendous changes in the structure of power. Likewise, from the Soviet side, a very similar image of interstate 
relations (although based on the supposed class nature of international relations) reflected the interests of specific 
structures of power within the Soviet ruling party who were resisting attempts to reform these structures from within 
the party.
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This becomes clear when we look at the definition of "ethnic group." An ethnic group 
is most commonly defined as a group of people who share a common language, culture, 
history, sense of belonging, etc. In the wider sense of the word, ethnicity is in fact one part 
of culture, and culture in turn can be seen as a shared system of communications, or a 
"language" in the wider sense of the word. What makes an ethnic group is therefore a 
shared system of communications in this wider sense. People are of course parts of a number 
of such communication systems, and other, non-ethnic communication systems or identities 
are no less "real" or relevant. Rather, in the context of the participation of the wider po­
pulation in politics, combined with the territorialized nature of political power dominant in 
the modern world and an international system which defines territorial sovereignty in terms 
of national units defined culturally, ethnicity becomes the "language" that political actors are 
driven to use for their own communicative (power) goals.
An ethnic group’s membership is thus determined not by shared interest (even "affec­
tive"), but by shared "language" or culture; that is, you are a member of an ethnic group not 
because of a commonality of interest with others, but because of a commonality of culture.6 
Although ethnicity may represent a type of cleavage (though in no way an absolute, impe­
netrable one), it is a communicative cleavage rather than an interest cleavage. Given the 
extent to which politics is about communication, such cleavages of course take on added 
importance in the political sphere, and may indeed become a basis of political organization 
in specific situations. The communicative aspect of ethnicity may make it appear to be a 
natural cleavage, which facilitates arguments about essential differences between "our" ethnic 
group and others, especially in ethnically homogeneous regions where most people have no 
day-to-day experience of others.
But even given that this communicative element may push toward a tendency to political 
cleavages along ethnic lines in particular political environments, this common mode of com­
munication says nothing at all about a commonality of interest; at most it provides political 
opportunity to make arguments based on this common "language". As with the state, an 
objective interest of all members of the group, especially when the group is as diverse as all 
of society, can be found only in the case of an immediate threat to the existence of the 
members of the group based on that identity, or to the communicative system they share. 
In such a case there may in fact be a clear and relatively objective common interest of all 
members of the group and therefore of the group itself. Yet even here, there is not neces­
sarily one objective way to defend that interest.7
In fact, what becomes clear is that rarely, in cases of ethnic conflict, are we talking 
about unorganized masses of ethnically-identified people spontaneously undertaking actions 
to realize their group interest. Rather, what is involved are organizations which claim to 
represent the interest of individuals identified by ethnicity. These organizations can range 
from states to political parties to liberation movements. But what all have in common is that 
they are political organizations seeking to achieve political aims. Given this fact, the critique 
of intergroup conflict theory described above is just as applicable to groups organized and 
described as ethnic as it is to the state. Thus, the concept of an ethnic group and the 
construction of an image of commonality of interest of the group must be seen as a political 
strategy of those elites who claim to speak in the name of the group. If they undertake 
conflictual actions, these actions must likewise be seen as the result of decisions made by
f’ The approach here, stressing the communicative nature of ethnic affiliation, is in contrast to those who stress 
the "affective” or emotional nature of ethnic solidarity. By stressing the "language" definition of ethnicity, this approach 
avoids the tendency to accept at face value arguments about a commonality of interest based on emotional or affective 
ties, putting it instead at the level of hypothesis to be tested.
7 Bosnia-Hercegovina’s Bosniak-Muslim community is a case where, in the face of genocide and the real possibility 
of destruction, the political community is seriously divided about the best strategy for survival (in an ethnic Bosniak- 
ministate or as part of a reconstituted Bosnia-Hercegovina).
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individuals who act in the name of an organization which acts in the name of the ethnic 
group; but these individuals are acting in a specific political context, that is, a context of 
conflict and competition within the organization or group.
As mentioned above, large-scale violent conflict is rarely the spontaneous action of 
even a significant part of an ethnic group. Rather, it is usually initiated by a very small 
number of people as part of a purposeful policy.8 Of course once violence is started it takes 
on its own logic and creates a spiral effect where violence may engulf entire ethnic groups. 
But of interest here is how the violence starts, the motivation of those elites who provoke 
such violent conflict.
When the elites in question are leaders of a state, acting in the name of an ethnic 
group, the above analysis of state leadership behavior would clearly apply; challenger elites 
may be either of the same ethnicity or different, although challenges from elites of the same 
ethnicity may be more threatening (because they can challenge culturally-based strategies) 
and thus would tend to produce more costly (violent) reactions. In the case of other types 
of ethnically-defined organizations, this same analysis is applicable. In such organizations 
elites seek power within the organization, as an end in itself or as a means to a specific end. 
To gain and maintain power, they must appeal to politically relevant audiences. TTie dynamic 
of power means that, as with the state, the actions or decisions undertaken in the name of 
the group by the leadership of an organization must be seen not only in light of the avowed 
interests of the organization, but also in the light of the interests of those who made the 
decision, both vis-ä-vis the outside but also in terms of factors internal to the organization 
and internal to the group whose interest is purportedly being promoted.9
Just as in the case of the state, among people of the same ethnicity there may exist 
very different views about what constitutes the interest of the group, whether there is in fact 
a common interset, and if so how to achieve that interest. In certain cases, in the face of 
potential threats to their own power positions, elites may be willing to undertake policies 
that have very high costs for individual members of the ethnic group but which bring great 
benefits to themselves. For example, in the case of within-group challenges where the chal­
lenger elites seem likely to mobilize the majority of relevant actors against the status quo, 
some elites may respond by provoking external conflict in order to shift the focus of political 
discourse to the threat from outside (the reaction to the provoked conflict), to images of a 
threatening other. Part of this agenda-setting or discourse-shaping strategy takes the form 
of the struggle over authenticity, that is, the definition of what makes a real Serb, Croat, 
Aleut, etc. Only those who fulfill this definition have the legitimate right to take part in 
political competition; the effect is thus to shut off entire ranges of political preferences and 
options and to monopolize the terms of political discourse. Such monopolization of course 
is more easily accomplished in the shadow of some external threat.
A major part of such a strategy of violence is for those who undertake it to insist on 
describing and explaining it with reference to interethnic relations, as due to ethnic divisions 
or to the evil doings of the other ethnic group (rather than only certain individuals in the 
other group), as being about inter-group relations. Yet as we have seen, methodologically 
the meaning of these statements can be understood only by putting them into the full political 
context in which the speaker exists, and they must be seen as attempts by the speaker to 
achieve specific goals vis-ä-vis particular audiences.
From this perspective it becomes clear that violent conflict along ethnic lines may have 
as a cause or as a goal factors within the ethnic group rather than in the relationship with
8 This is clearly the case in some of the most bloody examples of "ethnic conflict" in recent years: in Kenya, in 
Burundi and Rwanda, in Natal, South Africa around the time of the first multiparty elections there, in the Hindu-Muslim 
rioting in India, and in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia.
g For a similar analysis applied to parliamentary parties, see Tsebelis (1990).
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other ethnic groups.10 The use of violence, which inevitably provokes retaliatory violence 
against members of the group, has a particularly striking effect in that it solidifies the ethnic 
cleavage, "proves" that commonality of interests run only along that cleavage, thus reifying 
the image of the "ethnic group" as a real unit with real objective interests vis-ä-vis other 
ethnic groups in the same way that the international system has done for states. It imposes 
this ethnicized reality as something natural, thereby further limiting political options in the 
future, redirecting them away from internal conflict toward this external focus. Such a stra­
tegy thus causes this issue of external threat to monopolize political discourse, pushing aside 
other issues as less important. Even though it may in fact do great harm to the interests 
of even a majority of the individuals of a particular ethnicity, decreasing their security and 
well- being, it may be quite successful in achieving its intended goal, which is to promote 
the power interests of particular elites within the group.
This is not a case of manipulation, in the sense that people are being duped and don’t 
really know their own interests. Rather, what this strategy does is to restructure the political 
environment in such a way that the only way to achieve any goal is to accept its positioning 
along the ethnic axis. Any preference that comes into conflict with the officially defined 
interest of the ethnic group is silenced and relegated to non-reality. In this way, the re­
structuring of a political arena along ethnic lines through references to a threatening other, 
although in some ways serving to mobilize certain people along ethnic lines, in other very 
important ways serves to demobilize and silence those parts of the population for whom the 
"officially" defined interest of the ethnic nation is contrary to their interests, ethnic and 
otherwise. By depriving the population of the ability to dissent openly, it also deprives chal­
lenger elites from being able to mobilize people on other issues. By being confined only to 
an officially-defined, acceptable limit of political discourse, these would-be challengers are 
in fact made harmless. Violence not only ensures this qualitatively new political situation 
but it also makes it much harder to shift discourse back away from the monolithic image of 
the nation toward a more natural contention and competition across the entire range of 
political issues.
Conclusion
This article has provided an alternative framework with which to analyze inter-state 
and inter-group conflicts. Accepting that external conflict may in fact have its main goals 
within the state provides a way of understanding the dynamics of the international system 
as the interaction of domestic political conflicts. It also provides a way of understanding 
the effect of ideas of culture (including ethnicity) on the international system without dow­
nplaying the centrality of power, without resorting to methodologically questionable essen- 
tialist and essentializing analyses that see "ethnicity" as a motivating "belief system" or "af­
fective" factor, and without accepting "ethnic group" as anything more than a community of 
shared "language" rather than a community of interest. It likewise provides a way to under­
stand the dynamics of intergroup relations as the interaction of within-group conflict, and 
thereby suggests a different approach to non-state violent conflicts undertaken in the name 
of ethnic solidarity. By focusing on politics as a process of competition between elites of 
the same group, it shows a way to understand violent conflict as an outcome of intra-elite 
political competition rather than as due to some constructed image of a "group interest" or 
mere irrationality. It also points out how processes of change which affect domestic power 
can be generators of violent conflict described in cultural terms.
Such an approach clearly helps explain those cases in which conflictual behavior seems 
"irrational", that is, in which the external costs are much higher than the external benefits. 
Yet it should also provide a way of understanding cases where conflictual behavior toward
111 For the case of Serbia, see Gagnon (1994/5).
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the outside seems rational, for example where the stated goal of conflict is to gain territory, 
resources, diasporas, things that seem to be "natural" or "objective" interests. Clearly such 
interests cannot be assumed to be "natural" (as IR Realists do), especially since not every 
ethnic group goes to war for territorial or geo-strategic advantage. Indeed, the question of 
whether violent external conflict is ever "rational" (in terms of the external environment) is 
a fair one; this framework provides alternative explanations for such apparently "natural" 
behavior that nevertheless recognize the centrality of power to politics.
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ETNIČKI SUKOB KAO UNUTAR-GRUPNA 
POJAVA: PRELIMINARNI OKVIR
V P. GAGNON, Jr.
Peace Studies Program, Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY, USA
U literaturi posvećenoj etničkim sukobima postoji tendencija da se u 
obzir uzmu samo izvanjski izvori sukoba. Takvo stajalište - da su glavni uzroci 
etničkih sukoba u karakteru odnosa među etničkim skupinama, odnosno nji­
hovim elitama - može, međutim, biti pogrešno. U radu se izlaže kritika kon­
fliktne teorije razrađene unutar znanstvenog (politologijskoga) područja 
međunarodnih odnosa. Kritika obuhvaća koncepcijske i metodološke 
probleme analize među-grupnih sukoba i ukazuje na važnost unutar-grupnih 
sukoba (sukoba među "domaćim" elitama) kao izvora onih prvih. U zak­
ljučku, autor ističe važnost izložene kritike za razumijevanje uzroka i izvora 
nasilnih sukoba koji slijede etničke markere.
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